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War means threat to people’s lives. Research derived from terror management theory (TMT) illustrates that the awareness of 
death leads people to defend cultural ingroups and their worldviews to attain a sense of symbolic immortality and thereby buffer 
existential anxiety. This can result in hostile effects of mortality salience (MS), such as derogation of outgroup members, 
prejudice, stereotyping, aggression, and racism, which, in turn, can lead to the escalation of violent intergroup conflict and, thus, 
the escalation of war. Yet, escalation of destructive conflict following MS is not automatic. Instead, research on TMT suggests 
that MS does not necessarily result in conflict and intolerance but can also foster positive tendencies, such as intergroup fairness 
or approval of pacifism, depending on how existential threat is perceived, whether the need for symbolic self-transcendence is 
satisfied, which social norms are salient, and how social situations are interpreted. In the present paper we review current TMT 
research with the aim of reconciling the seemingly contradictory findings of hostile and peaceful reactions to reminders of death. 
We present a terror management model of escalation and de-escalation of violent intergroup conflicts, which takes into account 
the interaction between threat salience and features of the social situation. We also discuss possible intervention strategies to 
override detrimental consequences of existential threat and argue that war is not the inevitable consequence of threat.  
 
 
ar confronts people with threats to their lives. This is 
especially true for soldiers who are continually 
confronted with death during times of war. However, 
also civilians suffer from deadly terror—if not directly 
by being in the war zone then indirectly via exposure to war 
reporting in the media. Research has shown that when reminded of 
death, people become more intolerant and aggressive toward 
outgroup others and more strongly supportive of military action in 
intergroup conflict. Terror management research (Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & 
Greenberg, 2003) has explained these phenomena as resulting from 
humans’ efforts to manage the terror of their own mortality. From 
this perspective, standing by the ingroup, defending cultural 
worldviews, and bolstering self-esteem may serve to assure people 
of a symbolic collective existence and personal death 
transcendence. Tragically, these tendencies can lead to the 
escalation of conflicts, bringing about, for many of those involved, 
the very thing that terrifies them.  
At first glance, because humans are destined to die, and thus to 
experience existential threat, it would appear that humans are 
destined to be involved in intergroup conflict. But they are not, as 
we argue in the present article. Based on a review of recent terror 
management research, we provide evidence suggesting there are 
multiple circumstances under which the escalation of existentially 
threatening conflicts might be reduced, if not reversed. These 
circumstances include how threat is perceived, whether alternative 
anxiety buffers are available, and which ingroup norms and self-
categories are salient in a social situation. This review may help to 
uncover the conditions under which escalating intergroup conflict 
and approval of war are and are not likely. In addition, we suggest 
possible strategies for undermining the dynamics of escalating 
intergroup conflict and war. 
 
Terror Management Theory and Research 
 
Terror management theory (TMT) posits that, like other living 
creatures, humans have an instinctive desire for survival. What 
makes humans stand out, however, are their higher cognitive 
capacities, which lead to the uncomfortable awareness that they are 
going to die at some point. This knowledge exposes humans to the 
constant possibility of feeling annihilation anxiety. From a TMT 
perspective, our own culture offers protection from this fear of 
death by allowing us to see ourselves as making valuable 
contributions to a meaningful reality (e.g., Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004) and being part of an immortal 
collective entity, the cultural group (Castano & Dechesne, 2005). 
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More specifically, TMT suggests that death-related fear is 
decreased by a cultural anxiety buffer consisting of two 
components: (a) a cultural worldview—a culturally shared 
conception of reality that provides meaning, order and stability, 
standards, and values, through which one can feel valuable, and the 
promise of literal or symbolic death transcendence for those who 
live up to these standards of value, and (b) self-esteem, which is the 
belief that one meets the cultural standards of value. Because these 
psychological constructions are an integral part of helping people 
cope with their own mortality, death awareness motivates 
individuals to hold on to their cultural worldviews and believe in 
their worth as individuals within their cultural conception of reality 
(Becker, 1973; Greenberg et al., 1997). Integrating this approach 
with research on intergroup processes and social identity (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), 
Castano and Dechesne (2005) emphasized the central role of group 
membership in buffering anxiety. In response to existential threat, 
people shift to collective (instead of personal) self-categorization. 
This fosters perceived immortality of the self, because social 
ingroups usually survive the individual, and they are not typically 
conceived of as subject to physical extinction: “I” will die but “we” 
will live.  
The last 20 years have led to a substantial amount of evidence from 
different countries supporting predictions derived from TMT (for 
an overview see Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010): First, 
reminders of death (“mortality salience” or MS) have been shown 
to increase striving for self-protection and efforts to defend or even 
increase self-esteem. Furthermore, when reminded of death, 
people’s collective self-definitions become more important, and 
they adhere more strongly to their cultural worldviews and defend 
these views if necessary. Therefore, following MS, people exhibit 
ingroup favoritism and hatred toward adversary outgroups or those 
who threaten culturally shared norms and belief systems. This can 
lead to vicious cycles of violence and counterviolence (as 
described by Pyszczynski and colleagues especially with regard to 
terrorist and counterterrorist violence; cf. e.g., Motyl, Rothschild, 
& Pyszczynski, 2009; Pyszczynski, Motyl, & Abdollahi, 2009; 
Pyszczynski, Rothschild, Motyl, & Abdollahi, 2008; Pyszczynski, 
Vail, & Motyl, 2010). 
In the following section we first draw attention to an important 
distinction within TMT, between proximal and distal defense 
mechanisms. Afterward we focus on distal defense mechanisms 
and discuss how they can lead to the escalation of intergroup 
conflict. 
 
The Dual-Process Model of Proximal and Distal Defense 
Strategies 
 
A great deal has been learned over the last 25 years about the 
parameters and cognitive processes associated with MS effects. 
One important finding from this research is that we need to 
distinguish between conscious and nonconscious MS effects. The 
dual process model of terror management (see Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999) emphasizes that the conscious 
consequences of MS are typically denial of one’s vulnerability to 
premature death and suppression of death-related thoughts. This is 
called a proximal defense strategy and serves to push the problem 
of mortality out of people’s awareness. If these conscious defenses 
have been successful, then death thoughts continue to operate 
subconsciously (they are accessible but outside focal attention) and 
lead to distal defense mechanisms; that is, they affect people’s 
striving for self-esteem and cultural worldview defense. We now 
outline how these distal terror management processes regarding 
worldview defense and striving for self-esteem make it more 
difficult to coexist peacefully in society with people from other 
groups or with people who do not share our cultural views. 
  
Ingroup Favoritism, Prejudice, and Rigid Thinking 
 
Issues connected with social identity are often primary sources of 
intergroup conflict and hatred. Self-categorization as an ingroup 
member leads people to distance themselves from outgroups 
(Turner et al., 1987). Ingroup identification is positively associated 
with ingroup favoritism (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002) and 
under certain conditions outgroup hate (Brewer, 1999). In 
situations of existential threat, ingroup identification becomes 
pivotal. The ingroup is representative of a person’s cultural 
worldview; at the same time, defining the self in terms of the 
ingroup may elevate a person’s subjective sense of immortality. 
This explains why death reminders lead people to favor the ingroup 
and derogate outgroups and people who criticize the ingroup (for 
review, see Burke et al., 2010). Greenberg et al. (1990), for 
example, demonstrated that after MS, people favored those who 
shared their religion but derogated those who believed in another 
religion. Other research shows that following MS people cling 
more closely to their national ingroup, gender ingroup, or sport fan 
ingroup and, for example, attributed more negative, stereotypical 
judgment (e.g., Castano, 2004) or stronger blame (Nelson, Moore, 
Olivetti, & Scott, 1997) to the outgroup.  This is especially painful 
for people who are in a minority position in a society—such as 
immigrants who are exposed to increased social discrimination 
following death reminders. Bassett and Connelly (2011), for 
example, found that following MS, Americans reacted more 
negatively to an illegal immigrant from Mexico but not one from 
Canada, underlining that MS especially increases negative 
reactions to dissimilar others. Studies also showed that White 
participants exposed to MS sympathized with White racists more 
than participants who were not exposed to MS, suggesting that MS 
increases affiliation with racist ideologies (Greenberg, Schimel, 
Martens, Solomon, & Pyszcznyski, 2001). McGregor et al. (1998) 
tested physically aggressive reactions following MS and found that 
people exposed to MS distributed more of a very spicy hot sauce to 
a person who had criticized their political ideology—although they 
knew that the person did not like spicy food but would have to eat 
all of it. These effects seem to be even more pronounced when 
people interact as members of different groups compared to 
interindividual interactions (McPherson & Joireman, 2009).  
Besides the more straightforward effects MS can have on 
intergroup conflict and hostility, some effects of MS on social 
cognition may foster conflict escalation in an indirect fashion. One 
of these effects is the tendency of people following MS to rely 
more strongly on stereotypes, which are components of people’s 
cultural worldview, and prefer stereotype-consistent over 
stereotype-inconsistent outgroup members (Schimel et al., 1999). 
In the context of existentially threatening conflict, this means that 
hostile stereotypes of adversary groups may be sustained or even 
become stronger, which may contribute to the maintenance or 
escalation of the conflict. Research on terror management 
influences on other social cognitive processes adds to the picture 
that following MS, people tend to become more rigid and less 
flexible in their thinking (see, e.g., Jonas, Greenberg, & Frey, 
2003, for confirmatory information seeking; and Landau, Johns et 
al., 2004, for further social-cognitive structuring tendencies). Given 
that these tendencies toward rigidity are also heightened in aversive 
situations, they are an additional source for increased ingroup bias, 
stereotyping, and discrimination (see Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, 
& De Grada, 2006), which should have even more serious 
consequences in combination with MS. Indeed, Van der Zee and 
colleagues illustrated in an intercultural context that MS especially 
affected people who were open to people from different cultures, 
such that they became less open toward these people (Van der Zee 
& van der Gang, 2007; Van der Zee, Van Oudenhoven, & Grijs 
2004).  
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Taken together, the findings suggest a dangerous picture of MS in 
conflict situations.  Figure 1 (see Paths a–d) illustrates a terror 
management model of escalation and de-escalation of violent 
intergroup conflicts. This model is based on both research on the 
general effects of MS on defensive responses, described above, and 
more specific research on the implications of terror management 
processes for peace and conflict, which we describe in the 
following section. Path a represents the findings that MS motivates 
individuals to support and defend their social ingroups and related 
cultural worldviews. This kind of defensiveness should increase 
intolerance of people who think differently as well as derogation of 
outgroup members (Path b) and should lead to hostile behavior or 
aggravate existing aggressive interactions between individuals and 
groups (Path c). As such outcomes will likely provoke reciprocal 
responses by adversary outgroups and may thus increase the 
intensity of the violent conflict, levels of existential threat are then 
likely to be increased (Path d). In this way, MS might contribute to 
(and be the result of) the self-perpetuating tendency of violent 
intergroup conflict in which existential threat can be both an 
antecedent as well as an outcome of social conflict (see also 
Fritsche & Jonas, 2011; Niesta, Fritsche, & Jonas, 2008). 
 
 
 
Self-Perpetuation of Violent Intergroup Conflicts 
 
Many violent conflicts generate an environment in which 
reminders of death and the fragility of life are omnipresent. Given 
that it increases the motivation to support cultural ingroups and to 
become more hostile toward outgroup members, MS can function 
as “a built-in catalyst of hostile interaction” (Niesta et al., 2008, p. 
51) and thus can lead to a vicious cycle of violence.  
Meanwhile, numerous studies have documented that reminders of 
death increase support for violent solutions of international 
conflicts in different countries and support for extreme military 
action, which may fuel the escalation cycle: Pyszczynski, 
Abdollahi, Greenberg, and Solomon (2006) presented evidence that 
MS increased acceptance of extreme military force to fight 
terrorism, such as using nuclear or chemical weapons, among U.S. 
participants. In a similar vein, Iranian students approved of suicide 
attacks against U.S. targets when reminded of death—whereas in 
the absence of MS they disapproved of suicide attacks. Routledge 
and Arndt (2008) showed that MS also increased English 
participants’ willingness to self-sacrifice for England.  
Hirschberger and colleagues reported that MS increased Israelis’ 
support for their national military force (e.g., Hirschberger, 
Pyszczynski & Ein-Dor, 2009). They gave several examples 
suggesting that in times of war and terrorist threat, people are 
especially likely to consider violent solutions to conflicts as 
appropriate: Following MS, Israeli citizens more strongly 
supported a preemptive nuclear strike on Iran (Hirschberger et al., 
2009); furthermore, following MS right-wing Israelis more 
strongly approved of and intended to engage in violent measures of 
resistance with respect to the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip in 2005 (Hirschberger & Ein-Dor, 2006). Following MS, 
Israelis also more strongly supported military incursions into Gaza 
even if they were deemed militarily ineffective, capable only of 
bringing back a feeling of justice to the people of Israel 
(Hirschberger, Pyszczynski, & Ein-Dor, 2010).  
In the context of an ongoing civil war in the Ivory Coast, Chatard 
et al. (2011) found that among students from a progovernment 
area, MS increased support for the action of the government and its 
army. Kugler and Cooper (2010) found that following MS, U.S. 
participants approved more of harsh interrogation methods for a 
Saudi-Arabian terrorism suspect, whereas MS decreased this 
tendency when the suspect was an American. No effect of MS was 
observed for a non-Arab outgroup target from a nation allied with 
the United States (Bulgaria). Thus research from different countries 
focusing on different relevant outgroups converges on the idea that 
MS increases approval of violent conflict-intervention measures, 
supporting the proposed causal chain from Path a to Path c (Figure 
1). Escalation of violent intergroup conflicts thus seems to be likely 
as soon as mortality primes are involved.  
In addition, MS also seems to increase the risk that the de-
escalation work of international troops will fail. Dechesne, van den 
Berg, and Soeters (2007) showed that although Dutch and German 
soldiers worked together harmoniously in a nonthreatening 
environment, they exhibited stereotypic thinking and intergroup 
hostility toward the soldiers from the other nation when they 
operated under the threat of death during peace-keeping missions 
in Kabul.  
Moreover, reminders of death might also contribute to the self-
perpetuating nature of violent intergroup conflicts by increasing the 
preference for stereotypical thinking (Schimel et al., 1999). As 
Fritsche, Koranyi, Beyer, Jonas, and Fleischmann (2009) showed, 
MS can reduce the acceptance of outgroup members who support 
peaceful conflict solutions (“doves”) because they do not represent 
the prototypical enemy.1 Existential threat seems to preserve 
traditional perceptions of friend and foe (defense of preexisting 
cultural worldviews; see Figure 1, Path a) and, in a manner 
suggestive of a self-fulfilling prophecy, may undermine the 
potential for positive social change and possible intergroup 
reconciliation. Another example illustrating this assumption is a 
finding by Hirschberger, Canetti-Nisim, Pyszczynski, Kahn, and 
Gubler (2010, as reported in Hirschberger & Pyszczynski, 2011) 
showing that reminders of death and the Holocaust induced Israeli 
Jews to see Israeli Arabs as having more harmful and evil 
intentions toward them and toward the State of Israel. Furthermore, 
when reminded of death, Israeli Jews simplified the complex 
identity of Israeli Arabs (who are typically torn between a 
Palestinian and Israeli identity; e.g., Kimhi, Canetti, & 
Hirschberger, 2009) and preferred to categorize them as enemies of 
Israel—a finding pointing at the important role of social 
categorization in understanding escalation as well as de-escalation 
of conflict. (We return to this argument below.)  
Further escalating tendencies following MS can be derived from 
research suggesting that death primes lead to greater blaming of 
innocent victims (Hirschberger, 2006; see also Studies 4 and 5 of 
Landau, Johns et al., 2004, who found this to be the case especially 
for persons high in personal need for structure). These reactions of 
defending culturally shared beliefs in a just world (Figure 1, Path a; 
for research on just world beliefs and victim blaming see Hafer, 
2000) hinder peace work and reconciliation because victim 
blaming can help people justify violent actions.  
In times of violent intergroup conflict and war, people 
are often confronted in everyday life with reminders of death, 
terror, and destruction, for instance, when passing destroyed 
buildings on the streets or watching reports on television. Research 
shows that these natural reminders of death following from violent 
intergroup action lead to similar reactions to those described so far 
                                                        
1 In the study by Fritsche et al. (2009) non-Muslim respondents 
judged Muslim opponents of Islamist terrorism (nonstereotypical 
individuals) less positively after having been reminded of death. 
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in this article supporting Path d (Figure 1) and the notion of a 
recursive cycle of escalation in existentially threatening conflicts: 
Vail, Arndt, Motyl, and Pyszczynski (2012) found among 
American student participants that pictures of destroyed buildings 
increased death-thought accessibility compared to pictures of 
buildings that were under construction or pictures of buildings that 
were intact. Exposure to pictures of destroyed buildings 
furthermore increased dogmatic certainty about the participants’ 
beliefs (regardless of political orientation) and support for war 
against Iran as well as military action against international 
terrorism. 
In the context of terrorist attacks, there have been many studies 
investigating the effects of natural death reminders on people’s 
thinking and behavior. Research showed that salience of terrorist 
attacks not only increased death-thought accessibility (Landau, 
Solomon et al., 2004) but also prejudiced attitudes toward outgroup 
members (see, e.g., Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & 
Vermeulen, 2009, with regard to Arabs in the Netherlands) as well 
as support for U.S. President George W. Bush and his military 
counterterrorism policies (Landau, Solomon et al., 2004). Related 
research in Germany showed that the salience of terrorist threats 
increased social defensiveness in the form of more severe 
punishment intentions toward norm breakers (Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Frey, & Oßwald, 2007). Asbrock and 
Fritsche (in press) recently showed that making personal (but not 
collective) terrorist threats salient increased authoritarian attitudes 
and ingroup bias. This corresponds to field studies suggesting in a 
similar vein that Americans responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
with increased intolerance, prejudice, and discrimination toward 
those groups of people who were symbolically connected with the 
attacks (Morgan, Wisneki, & Skitka, 2011).  
Looking at the role of the media in this context, obviously many 
death and terror reminders are included in media reports, thereby 
inducing worldview defense among citizens; but death reminders 
also affect how and what journalists write. Indeed, Cullier (2012) 
found that college journalists incorporated more negative facts 
about an outgroup into a news story following MS than following a 
control prime. Media reports also often include threats to people’s 
worldview and thereby undermine people’s anxiety buffer, which 
is especially needed in times of threat. Research has shown that 
threats to people’s worldviews increase accessibility of death-
related thoughts (Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007), 
which in turn should increase worldview defense. Hayes, Schimel, 
and Williams (2008), for example, found that reading a worldview-
threatening newspaper article about the Muslimization of Nazareth 
increased death-thought accessibility and worldview defense for 
Christian Canadian participants. Yet ironically, if the participants 
learned that a number of Muslims had died on their way to 
Nazareth, the increase in death-thought accessibility and 
worldview defense was prevented.  
Taken together, there is a whole body of evidence suggesting an 
overwhelmingly negative picture of MS in conflict situations, 
supporting the escalation model presented in Figure 1 (Paths a–d). 
Existential threat (which is inherent in most violent intergroup 
conflicts) aggravates the escalation of intergroup conflict because it 
increases people’s motivation to support and defend their social 
ingroups and related worldviews (Path a). This, in turn, increases 
hostile intergroup attitudes and behavior (Paths b and c), which are 
then likely to escalate conflict because they provoke reciprocally 
hostile responses that have the potential to further increase levels 
of existential threat inherent in the conflict (Path d and then again 
Paths a–d). Indeed, looking at real-life conflicts it becomes evident 
that in war-torn countries plagued with violence and killing, 
intensified intergroup hostility and an escalation of violence is 
often observed. For example, following the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, there were more suicide bombings than ever before (as 
reported in Motyl et al., 2009). 
Yet existential threat does not inevitably end in tragedy; we now 
present pathways of hope, derived from other terror management 
evidence, showing that MS in combination with certain moderator 
variables (see Figure 1, Paths I–III) does not lead to intergroup 
hostility and conflict escalation: Path I shows that existential threat 
can be perceived in different ways, sometimes not eliciting any 
effect on social behavior at all; Path II shows that effects of MS 
may be reduced by alternative anxiety-buffering strategies that are 
unrelated to social conflict; and Path III shows that the effects of 
MS may be redirected by salient contents of the cultural worldview 
encouraging compliance with social norms and self-categorization 
that may, in fact, encourage prosocial instead of aggressive 
behavior.  
 
How Can the Vicious Cycle Be Broken? 
 
Perception of Threat. The most direct way in which the vicious 
cycle of existential threat and violent intergroup conflict can be 
broken is to circumvent the experience of threat. However, 
especially for members and families of the armed services and 
countless civilians caught up in conflict and war, it might not be 
possible to reduce mortality reminders in intensely violent 
intergroup conflict situations. Moreover, politicians frequently use 
threat and mortality reminders as a strategy to increase people’s 
readiness for war (e.g., Nikolaev & Porpora, 2006; Landau, 
Solomon et al., 2004). Nevertheless, people and situations may 
differ in regard to how a death threat is initially appraised (see 
Figure 1, Path I). For some people and under some conditions, the 
awareness of human mortality seems to lack the threatening quality 
it typically exhibits. Dispositional and situational moderators offer 
one avenue for reducing the destructive effects of MS. 
 
Self-determination and control. Fritsche, Jonas, and Fankhänel 
(2008) suggested that it is especially the perception of generalized 
lack of personal control that makes mortality threatening. Allowing 
participants to experience partial control over their own death—for 
example, by reflecting on the possibility of self-determined death 
as in the case of committing suicide when suffering from an 
incurable disease—has been shown to reduce ethnocentric 
tendencies compared to thinking about uncontrollable death. Also 
MS effects are less pronounced in people perceiving high internal 
locus of control (Talati, Fritsche, Du, Jonas, & Castano, 2013). To 
explain these findings, it has been suggested that MS effects may 
have their origin in the fact that death poses a threat to people’s 
sense of generalized control, and that acting in terms of group 
membership may restore subjective control through the (social) self 
(Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011). A low sense of control has also 
been identified as one of the factors reducing victims’ readiness for 
reconciliation in intergroup conflicts (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, 
Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009).   
 
Religion. Certain belief systems also seem to protect people 
against existential threat following MS. Research has shown that 
MS increases participants’ investment in core religious symbols, 
self-reported religiosity, and their belief in divine intervention (for 
an overview, see Vail et al., 2010). Thus, religion seems to help 
people manage death concerns—and indeed, Jonas and Fischer 
(2006) showed among German Christian participants that after the 
affirmation of religious beliefs, intrinsically religious persons did 
not react with worldview defense following MS.2 In several studies 
of other countries (for Christians and Jews in the United States, 
Muslims in Iran, and Christians in Poland) Golec de Zavala, 
Cichocka, Orehek, and Abdollahi (2012) furthermore found that 
                                                        
2 See also Dechesne et al., 2003, who demonstrated that providing 
participants with evidence about a nonreligious afterlife also 
reduced MS effects. 
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MS strengthened the link between intrinsic religious commitment 
and decreased intergroup hostility (such as support for aggressive 
counterterrorism and negativity toward religious outgroups). These 
findings support the assumption that religious beliefs such as the 
belief in the immortality of the soul or supernatural agents may 
protect people from existential threat and may therefore reduce 
worldview defense following death reminders. Furthermore, 
religious groups seem to be quite persistent over time, thus 
providing their members a sense of collective death transcendence 
through the social self (see Castano & Dechesne, 2005).3 
 
Alternative Buffers of Anxiety 
 
A different possibility for breaking the vicious cycle of threat and 
violent ethnocentric responses rests on the central role of 
alternative anxiety-buffering processes (see Figure 1, Path II). 
Although intolerance and aggression against outgroups are in 
themselves expressions of an anxiety buffer (i.e., forms of 
worldview defense), the activation of alternative anxiety buffers 
may prevent negative intergroup behavior because they may 
provide existential security, make people less vulnerable to 
anxiety, and reduce accessibility of death-related thoughts. We 
now sketch various alternative buffers that may allow people to 
withstand existential threat without resorting to negative intergroup 
behavior. 
 
Self-esteem. Self-esteem provides a sense of personal value, 
obtained by believing that one is living up to the cultural standards 
provided by one’s worldview. Self-esteem plays a crucial role in 
coping with the omnipresent terror that results from the human 
awareness of being mortal (for an overview, see Pyszczynski et al., 
2004). Research has shown that (a) MS increases striving for self-
esteem; (b) self-esteem striving buffers existential anxiety; and (c) 
boosts in self-esteem (e.g., through positive intelligence test 
results) reduce the effect of MS on worldview defense and death-
thought accessibility. Thus, in situations of severe intergroup 
conflict, if people have the feeling that they are valuable 
contributors to a meaningful universe—that is, if their self-esteem 
is strengthened and if the threat does not target the dimension on 
which the self-esteem boost took place (as Arndt & Greenberg, 
1999, specified)—this should reduce defensive responses to threat.  
However, it should be noted that self-esteem striving may also 
have detrimental effects when people are trying to boost their self-
esteem by derogating others or zealously executing ingroup 
doctrines of hostile intergroup conflict. Furthermore, Taubman-
Ben-Ari and Findler (2006) suggested that high self-esteem seems 
to channel people’s defenses in particular directions. They showed 
among young Israeli men with high self-esteem that MS increased 
motivation for military service and anticipated physical hardships 
                                                        
3 The affirmation of religious beliefs and their intrinsic nature 
seems to be crucial to religion reducing worldview defense. 
Looking at the role of religion without this specification, religions 
have not always played a magnanimous or peacekeeping role in the 
area of severe intergroup conflict. Although most religions teach us 
that war is wrong and is justified only as a last resort to resolve 
conflicts, in history, religion also has often played a destructive 
role in intergroup conflict. Innumerable people have died in violent 
religious conflicts and so-called “holy wars.” Furthermore, 
religious fundamentalism has been found to be positively 
associated with racism, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and militarism 
(for an overview, see Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009). 
Fundamentalist religious people seem to respond especially 
hostilely to people who threaten their worldview (Motyl & 
Pyszczynski, in press). Below, we discuss the appeasing potential 
of religion and especially focus on the role of salient religious 
values, which are important in this context. 
in the army compared to a control condition. Whereas young men 
with low self-esteem seemed to perceive service in the army as a 
threat, men with high self-esteem seemed rather to perceive it as an 
opportunity to live up to social expectations and as a challenge to 
prove their competence.4   
 
Integration in cultural ingroups. Defining the self in terms of a 
social ingroup may buffer the threat of personal annihilation as it 
provides a sense of collective immortality (Castano & Dechesne, 
2005). As outlined above, this can lead to increased ingroup 
identification, triggering ingroup bias when people are confronted 
with existential threat. However, and in line with the same 
rationale, secure integration in a social ingroup should also reduce 
further social defensiveness. Supporting this reasoning, participants 
who thought about their ingroup of Americans showed reduced 
accessibility of death-related thoughts following MS compared to 
those who had to think about the outgroup of the British (Vaes, 
Heflick, & Goldenberg, 2010, Study 3). Thus, it is possible that 
those people who are well embedded in one or more social 
identities are those who will react less defensively to reminders of 
death in violent intergroup conflict. Importantly, such mitigating 
effects should be confined to cases where people are securely 
embedded in groups that are not involved in the actual intergroup 
conflict (e.g., sports club, professional association, or family).   
For immersion in a cultural ingroup to reduce defensiveness 
against an existential threat, at least three basic conditions should 
be fulfilled: (a) Individuals should be well integrated in the group 
or perceive themselves as matching the ingroup’s prototype. If this 
is not the case, the resulting threat to self-esteem (Leary, 2006) 
may instead increase defensiveness. (b) Secure group membership 
should only alleviate defensiveness following a death threat when 
people expect the ingroup to have certain characteristics: Sani, 
Herrera, and Bowe (2009) demonstrated that MS induced people to 
highlight the cultural continuity of their ethnic ingroup, indicating 
that collective continuity over time is important for buffering 
existential threat. This is also supported by research from 
Routledge and Arndt (2008) who showed that if people imagined 
being embedded in an immortal group (by imagining that they had 
joined an organization that had existed for some time before they 
joined it and that would continue to exist after they were gone) 
they were no longer willing to self-sacrifice for their country 
following MS. Other researchers have found that following a 
threat, people highlight ingroup entitativity (Fritsche et al., 2008), 
which is the perception that a group is both homogeneous and 
agentic (Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004). (c) As a third condition, the 
relevant social identity itself must not be under attack, because if it 
is, highly identified group members are the first to react fiercely on 
behalf of their ingroup. Fritsche et al. (2013, Study 4) worked with 
a minimal group design and found that MS led participants to 
derogate outgroup members only when they additionally had 
received information that the ingroup was quite heterogeneous with 
regard to important basic values (without such a threat to the 
group’s boundaries, i.e., for a homogeneous group, no MS effect 
occurred).  
 
Worldview affirmation. By providing a meaningful framework 
for understanding our existence, cultural worldviews defuse the 
threat of death. However, cultural worldviews only serve their 
anxiety-buffering functions when they are consistent and stable. If 
an individual’s worldview is bolstered and thus perceived to be 
secure and stable, this should buffer against existential anxiety and 
make further affirmation in the form of worldview defense 
                                                        
4 See also Schmeichel et al. (2009) for the importance of 
distinguishing between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Implicit 
self-esteem seems to function more consistently as an anxiety 
buffer in response to MS than explicit self-esteem. 
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unnecessary. Indeed, Schmeichel and Martens (2005) showed that 
affirming one important aspect of one’s worldview (through a 
standard self-affirmation procedure) reduced worldview defense 
and death-thought accessibility after MS. This effect was shown to 
be specifically the result of worldview affirmation and not of 
increased personal self-esteem. Also relevant is the aforementioned 
finding of Jonas and Fischer (2006) that intrinsically religious 
people who were given an opportunity to reaffirm their religious 
beliefs prior to MS did not demonstrate any subsequent worldview 
defense. In addition, worldview-affirming primes increased 
people’s willingness to purchase foreign products following MS, 
suggesting an increased openness toward foreign cultures 
(Sullivan, Jonas, & Jodlbauer, 2011). 
 
Close relationships. Close relationships and secure attachment 
also serve as anxiety buffers and reduce defensiveness when death 
is salient (for an overview, see Mikulincer, Florian, & 
Hirschberger, 2004). Death awareness has been shown to motivate 
people to develop and invest in social relationships and to endorse 
and strive for romantic intimacy. Imagining separation from a close 
partner or having problems with the partner, on the other hand, 
increased the accessibility of death-related thoughts. Alternatively, 
the salience of a close relationship partner or secure attachment 
prevents worldview defense. Cox et al. (2008) furthermore found 
that activating thoughts about one’s parents decreased death-
thought accessibility and increased self-esteem. Most importantly, 
Weise et al. (2008) showed that a secure-relationship prime 
reversed the effect of MS on support for violent actions; that is, 
with the prime, MS participants favored less violent tactics in 
response to the problem of terrorism.  
 
Offspring. Children can also serve as a means of symbolic 
immortality: Parents may feel that crucial aspects of themselves 
continue to live on through their children. Indeed, several studies 
have demonstrated that MS increases people’s desire to have 
children (e.g., Fritsche et al., 2007; Wisman & Goldenberg, 2005). 
Furthermore, images of newborn animals decreased the number of 
death-related thoughts (Zhou, Lei, Marley, & Chen, 2009). Making 
salient one’s potential children also served as an anxiety buffer, 
eliminating worldview defense (Fritsche et al., 2007).   
 
Pro-social Action in Line with Salient Cultural Norms and Self-
categorization 
 
Up to now, we have discussed mechanisms that prevent the 
experience of potentially threatening situations from resulting in 
social defensiveness (Figure 1, Paths I and II). Escalation of 
existentially threatening conflict might also be prevented on a third 
path. Path III builds on the observation that following MS, people 
defend those ideas and behaviors that they believe are prescribed 
by their cultural worldview and the group they belong to. This 
implies that people do not simply become more hostile in the wake 
of threats to their existence. Instead, MS encourages compliance 
with collectively shared norms. These norms do not need to be 
inherently aggressive. Most cultural groups are characterized by an 
endless number of norms that guide thinking and action in various 
directions. Many of these norms, in fact, encourage peaceful and 
de-escalating behavior. This coexistence of different norms is 
nicely illustrated by, for example, the recent public debate about 
building a mosque close to Ground Zero. What should a “good 
American” think? Some may say that it is patriotic to prevent the 
mosque; others may find that it is every American’s duty to allow 
the mosque. Some may feel that America is in conflict with radical 
Islam, whereas others may perceive America to be in conflict with 
its own constitutional values of tolerance and liberty (see 
Moghaddam, this issue). As this example shows, the cultural 
worldviews that are defended under threat are relative. They 
depend on perceptions of what constitutes being a good person 
(personal norms) or a good member of the cultural ingroup 
(ingroup norm). Which of these norms dictates behavior in a given 
situation depends on which personal or social norm is immediately 
salient; that is, an opinion on whether the Muslim parish should be 
allowed to build the mosque might vary depending on whether a 
person is listening to religious fanatics preaching intergroup hatred 
or thinking of the U.S. Constitution (in fact, U.S. President Obama 
has emphasized the latter norm when commenting on the debate; 
Stolberg, 2010). Many worldviews contain norms and values that 
elicit harmonious behavior by promoting help, fairness, and 
equality, as well as empathy and compassion. If following MS 
people cling more to their ingroup and want to demonstrate that 
they are valuable members of their society, they can do this under 
certain circumstances by showing culturally prescribed prosocial 
and peaceful behavior.  
Research supports this assumption by showing that existential 
threat motivates people to follow salient cultural norms. Depending 
on which aspect of their cultural worldview is activated in a 
specific situation, people do not only comply with norms of 
intergroup hostility. They show the opposite tendency, if peace-
fostering norms are activated, such as intergroup fairness or 
approval of pacifism. Though conflicting norms often coexist 
within a person’s cultural worldview, terror management research 
suggests that the norm that produces congruent action following 
MS seems to be the one that is most prominent in consciousness at 
any given moment. We next elaborate on these principles by 
looking at three kinds of norms (cf. Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 
1991): Personal norms represent our internalized sense of how we 
should behave; injunctive norms describe what ought to be done 
from a society’s moral perspective; and descriptive norms 
represent standards that develop out of our observations of others’ 
behavior. 
 
Personal norms. Terror management research suggests that the 
personal importance of prosocial values for a certain person can 
counteract otherwise hostile reactions induced by MS, as shown for 
liberal people who tended to become more tolerant following MS 
(Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel (1992, Study 
1) or empathic persons who were more willing to forgive an 
aggressive outgroup member following MS (Schimel, Wohl, & 
Williams, 2006). Several examples show that MS polarizes 
people’s reactions depending on their personal norms: For 
example, Weise, Arciszewski, Verlhiac, Pyszczynski, and 
Greenberg (2012) showed for right-wing authoritarians that MS 
increased negative evaluations of an immigrant, whereas for those 
people scoring low on right-wing authoritarianism, MS led to more 
positive evaluations and to more interest in a social interaction with 
the immigrant.  
Looking at people’s values on a societal level in times of crises, 
one also often finds amplified and polarized attitudes: For example, 
Cuillier, Duell, and Joireman (2009) showed that under conditions 
of MS, the more people valued national security the less they 
supported freedom of the media and the right to criticize public 
officials or the U.S. military. Thus personal norms and values 
virtually predetermine reactions to MS. If people hold prosocial or 
liberal norms, this may significantly lessen or even overturn hostile 
intergroup reactions in times of threat.  
 
Situationally activated injunctive norms. Cultural worldviews 
consist of complex, multifaceted sets of ideas and values usually 
containing conflict-enhancing as well as conflict-reducing elements 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2008). The specific situation determines which 
aspect of people’s cultural worldview and which corresponding 
norm are salient. Meanwhile, numerous studies have shown that 
existential threat drives people to comply with salient injunctive 
cultural norms of how good people should behave. The activation 
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of these prosocial norms has been shown to counteract otherwise 
observed hostile reactions following MS. 
The situational activation of tolerance among American college 
students, for example, counteracted the negative effect of MS 
toward dissimilar others (Greenberg et al., 1992, Study 2) and 
eliminated the increase in negative attitudes toward Muslims that 
was typically induced by MS (Vail, Arndt, Rampy, Pope, & Pinel, 
2012). In related research, Gailliot, Sillman, Schmeichel, Maner, 
and Plant (2008) found that following MS, activation of the 
cultural value of egalitarianism reduced prejudice toward Blacks 
(among non-Black participants). Jonas, Sullivan, and Greenberg (in 
press) showed that the activation of a fairness norm increased 
generous monetary behavior following MS, and Jonas et al. (2008) 
demonstrated that when opposite norms (e.g., proself vs. prosocial) 
are primed, MS enforces opposite reactions in line with the 
activated norms.  
In a similar vein, and highly relevant in the context of peace 
processes, a further study by Jonas et al. (2008) examined the 
interactive effect of MS combined with a pacifism norm induced 
by embedding pacifism-related words (peace, reconciliation, 
harmony, etc.) in a word-search task. After participants had been 
told that there was considerable danger to their country (Germany) 
due to the development of nuclear weapons in Iran, they were 
asked to rate a number of conflict-resolution strategies. Whereas an 
MS prime alone reduced the approval of peaceful conflict 
resolution strategies, in combination with a pacifism prime MS 
increased interest in peaceful strategies. However, Hirschberger et 
al. (2009) found that de-escalating messages decreased conflict-
fostering attitudes only in those people who in addition to 
experiencing experimental manipulation of MS were exposed to 
existential threat because they lived in a war-exposure area in 
Israel. 
Rothschild et al. (2009) showed that priming compassionate 
religious values, in combination with MS, reduced the approval of 
harsh military action to defend U.S. interests among U.S. 
participants, and a similar induction also reduced hostile anti-
Western attitudes in a sample of Iranian Shiite Muslims. 
Obviously, the salience of peace-related religious norms can make 
people more supportive of conciliatory policies under existential 
threat. However, interestingly, in the U.S. samples this effect was 
only observed among people who scored high on religious 
fundamentalism, and only when compassionate values were framed 
as religious (and not as secular) values. These findings suggest that 
for norms to interact effectively with MS they must be explicitly 
associated with the ingroup (in this case, the religious ingroup).  
In a study looking at the MS effects on the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election, participants exposed to MS but primed with 
compassionate values preferred the Democratic candidate Barack 
Obama, who was perceived to be more compassionate than the 
Republican candidate John McCain. However, in the neutral values 
condition, MS led participants to vote for the Republican candidate 
(Vail, Arndt, Motyl, & Pyszczynski, 2009). This result again shows 
that following MS, the salience of values can shift people’s 
behavior to be in accordance with these social norms. 
 
Descriptive norms: What does it mean to be “us”? By following 
injunctive cultural norms people affirm their personal self-
esteem—they behave how “good people” should behave. On a 
more basic level, norm compliance under threat can also be 
conceived of as a by-product of people’s heightened desire to 
affiliate with a group and their tendency to think of themselves as 
group members (Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Therefore, they tend 
to adopt normative ingroup standards as personal norms (self-
stereotyping; Turner et al., 1987). For example, highly identified 
group members who perceive competitive or even hostile behavior 
toward outgroups as being the ingroup norm may become more 
biased and hostile when self-stereotyping. In contrast, when the 
ingroup is seen as highly valuing the norms of fairness and 
tolerance, more peaceful interactions with outgroup members 
would be expected from high identifiers. Tendencies in either 
direction may be increased under existential threat. 
Descriptive norms consist of beliefs about how members of a 
group actually behave (and not how they are normatively expected 
to behave). Jonas and Fritsche (2012) demonstrated that descriptive 
ingroup norms have the potential to eliminate even those responses 
to MS that might be considered hard-wired, group-based thought 
tendencies (such as positive ingroup bias): When individuals 
believed their fellow ingroup members were pessimistic about 
future ingroup outcomes, MS did not lead to the usual increase of 
positive ingroup thinking; however, when their fellow ingroup 
members were perceived to be optimistic, MS increased ingroup 
boasting. In another study by Giannakakis and Fritsche (2011, 
Study 3), this effect becomes even more evident: Here, British 
university students were told that polls had shown that students of 
their university were very collectivistic; as a consequence they 
reacted to MS with increased bias in favor of the ingroup. In 
contrast, when students were told that their ingroup was very 
individualistic and did not care much about their group of students 
from their own respective university, MS decreased ingroup bias in 
resource allocations between their own university and another. 
Thus, paradoxically increased adherence to group norms following 
MS can lead to less ingroup support if collective thinking is 
counteracted by ingroup norms.  
In a similar vein, social consensus information can be considered 
as a descriptive ingroup norm. Accordingly, Abdollahi, Henthorn, 
and Pyszczynski (2009) showed that MS only increased support for 
violent martyrdom attacks if participants had received high social 
consensus information or no information regarding martyrdom 
attacks. However, low consensus information suggesting that most 
people in their country were against martyrdom attacks prevented 
the increased support for this kind of violence following MS.  
 
Defend the ingroup! But who is the ingroup? Group-based 
reactions to existential threat should depend not only on which 
ingroup norm is salient in a situation but also on who is defined as 
the ingroup. Social categorizations of “us” and “them” are flexible 
and contingent upon social situations. That is, acting as a group 
member under threat may lead people to derogate a person when 
she or he is assigned to the outgroup (e.g., a French person judged 
by a British person) but may lead to more positive evaluation of the 
same person when he or she is seen as an ingroup member (e.g., a 
European). This effect of recategorization was demonstrated by 
Giannakakis and Fritsche (2011, Study 2; for studies on 
recategorization effects in intergroup contact, see Gaertner, Mann, 
Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). The power of fluidly changing self-
categorizations has also been investigated by Halloran and 
Kashima (2004), who found that indigenous Australians defended 
individualistic values following MS when they had been thinking 
of themselves as Australian citizens. When they had been reminded 
of their indigenous identity, however, they defended collectivistic 
values as a response to existential threat. 
Meanwhile, there are several research examples showing that 
recategorizing, and thereby overriding boundaries between ingroup 
and outgroup, can redirect the effects of MS. Data obtained by 
Motyl et al. (2011) showed that subtle reminders of shared human 
experiences eliminated MS-induced negative reactions toward out-
groups, such as anti-Arab prejudice and negative attitudes toward 
immigrants. In one study the authors presented pictures of families 
from diverse cultures versus pictures of typical White American 
families. In a second study they asked American participants to 
read about childhood memories of an ostensibly foreign (vs. 
American) person and then write about their own similar 
experiences. These manipulations increased a sense of common 
humanity, a variable that in fact mediated the mitigating effect of 
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the commonality treatment on MS effects. In a similar vein, 
Pyszczynski et al. (2012) asked Americans and Palestinian citizens 
of Israel to think about the shared global consequences of climate 
change (vs. thinking about a local catastrophe). This induction of 
shared experience reduced the support for violence following MS. 
Thus, even at the height of Israeli military action in Gaza in 2009, 
MS had the power to increase support for peace, if self-
categorization had taken place before. Furthermore Motyl, Hart, 
and Pyszczynski (2010) found that convincing people to categorize 
themselves as distinct from other creatures (animals) decreased 
support for military action when human violence had been linked 
to animal violence. Because humans self-categorized themselves as 
different from animals they also distanced themselves from 
ostensibly typical animal features (such as aggression) in this 
situation. 
In summary, the findings on the nature of MS effects that are 
situationally moderated by ingroup norms and self-categorization 
(see Figure 1, Path III) illustrate that tendencies to defend social 
ingroups and their worldviews under threat do not necessarily lead 
to increased conflict and hatred. Instead, positive ingroup norms 
such as benevolence or pacifism can even lead people to more 
strongly endorse peaceful modes of intergroup interaction under 
conditions of existential threat. At the same time, inclusion of an 
outgroup in a superordinate self-category can improve intergroup 
attitudes under threat. In general, people respond to existential 
threat by acting as normative group members. To break the vicious 
cycle of self-perpetuating existentially threatening conflicts, it is 
crucial to consider and try to positively influence what the 
normative implications of group membership might be in any given 
situation. Norms of tolerance, intergroup cooperation, and peaceful 
conflict resolution might be influential under any conditions. 
However, given the catalyzing power of existential threat they 
might decide upon war or peace in times of existentially 
threatening crises. 
 
Not Destined to Wage War, but Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
Humans are destined to die, but not to wage war. Although terror 
management processes help to explain the escalation of 
existentially threatening conflict between groups (e.g., war, 
terrorism and counterterrorism; Paths a–d (Figure 1) of our TMT-
based analysis also make clear that self-perpetuation of these 
conflicts is not automatic and inevitable. Instead, we have outlined 
three different kinds of intervening terror management processes 
that may break the vicious cycle of threat and violence. First, 
confrontation with death is not always perceived as threatening, as 
has been shown for intrinsically religious people or for situations in 
which people consider death to be self-determined and thus partly 
controllable (Figure 1, Path I). Second, existential threat might be 
initially buffered when people are embedded in circumstances that 
provide a sense of death transcendence, such as boosts to self-
esteem, secure immersion in alternative cultural ingroups, secure 
attachment, deep affiliation with a romantic partner, or thinking of 
one’s own offspring (Path II). The third way in which the presence 
of death and fragility can be prevented from eliciting hostile 
intergroup behavior is related to the very nature of what it means to 
be a proper member of the cultural ingroup and which group 
people feel they belong to (Path III). We have reviewed evidence 
that salient ingroup norms determine how cultural worldview 
defense is expressed. When norms of tolerance, fairness, 
benevolence, or pacifism, were salient, MS induced people to think 
and act in a more tolerant, fair, benevolent, or pacifist fashion. 
Descriptive ingroup norms of individualism even led to reduced 
levels of ingroup bias following reminders of death. Self-
categorizing as members of a common ingroup (as, e.g., 
Europeans, members of a common human family) also reduced 
threat responses of ingroup bias and intergroup violence.  
 
Threat Effects on Intergroup Attitudes Are Malleable 
The malleability of threat effects on intergroup attitudes is the 
basic message of the reviewed literature. This is important not only 
from a scientific but also from an applied or even political 
perspective. Deep pessimism about human nature and the dynamics 
of “intractable” conflicts may often pave the way for support and 
approval of military strategies directed at resolving the conflict but 
may promote self-fulfilling prophecies of violent intergroup 
conflict. For example, politicians may hold naïve theories 
suggesting that voters support cries to arms in times of mass 
societal threat, as in the case of the 9/11 attacks. As seen above, 
some findings indeed support this notion.  
At the same time, the reviewed research demonstrates that a simple 
threat–aggression link is wrong. People do not always appraise 
death as a threat; they may rely on alternative anxiety buffers other 
than worldview defense, and if cultural worldview defense is, in 
fact, triggered, salient ingroup norms determine if people will 
become zealous hawks or passionate doves. In terms of 
understanding intergroup conflict, this means that groups and 
societies involved in violent intergroup conflict will not 
automatically drift toward intolerance and hostility, and that 
although it might be lay-Machiavellian wisdom to cry for war in 
times of threat, there should be more sustainable (and peaceful!) 
strategies that leaders can rely on while still winning the support of 
the people. Our model (see Figure 1) suggests various ways to 
prevent the malicious effects of MS and may even show how 
societies and groups can make positive use of the motivational 
energy released when people are confronted with existential 
realities.  It is our hope to inspire intervention strategies that take 
into consideration the destructive and constructive powers of the 
threat of death in violent intergroup conflicts. But what 
opportunities for intervention do we see? 
 
Opportunities for Intervention 
 
Reduction of mortality reminders. Preventing existential threat 
from occurring might be the most basic way to break the cycle of 
intergroup violence. Anything that could be done to stop the deadly 
nature of a conflict would reduce ethnocentric thinking and 
worldview defense, which often promote intergroup violence. 
Next, the systematic use of death reminders, which seems to be a 
common strategy by politicians to make citizens ready to support 
military interventions, should be eschewed. Often these messages 
are deliberately overstated or even false (e.g., Nikolaev & Porpora, 
2006). Yet, they have the desired effect of making people support 
aggression toward outgroups (see Lewandovsky et al., this issue).  
Thus, one straightforward strategy based on TMT would be to 
eliminate the purposeful use of death reminders (especially in 
combination with the activation of aggressive norms) to influence 
citizens.  
 
Fighting threat. Beliefs in high personal control in general (Talati 
et al., 2013), and about death in particular (Fritsche et al., 2008) 
have been shown to eliminate the detrimental effects of death 
awareness. Thus, one possibility for reducing the self-perpetuation 
of violent conflict lies in strengthening people’s perceptions of 
control and personal freedom. This might be accomplished both on 
the societal as well as the individual level. Research by Agroskin 
and Jonas (2010) suggested that perceiving control in the 
sociopolitical sphere is connected with low levels of 
authoritarianism, prejudice, and ethnocentrism. Democracy and 
political participation may create a sense of self-determination and 
thus control in people, which may allow them to appraise 
existential uncertainties and demands as less threatening. 
Democracies, indeed, have been found to be more peaceful in how 
they treat their people, internally, and how they respond to conflict, 
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externally, that is, with respect to other regimes (for an overview 
see Alexander, Inglehart, & Welzel, 2012). Yet, whether as a 
consequence people from democracies show smaller MS effects in 
general or respond to MS in a different manner from people from 
nondemocracies remains a question for future research.  
 
Providing alternative anxiety buffers.  Encouraging people to 
utilize alternative anxiety buffers beyond basic worldview defense 
may prevent existential threat from increasing intolerance and 
intergroup hatred. We have discussed some of these alternative 
buffer mechanisms, such as self-esteem, immersion in cultural 
ingroups, secure interpersonal attachment, and focusing on one’s 
own offspring. It is possible that societies that offer people the 
satisfaction of their basic psychological needs (e.g., Pittman & 
Zeigler, 2007), such as self-esteem or belonging generally, are 
most resilient in the face of existentially threatening crises. In 
contrast, societies that fail to satisfy basic psychological needs may 
be fertile ground for escalating cycles of intergroup violence and 
existential threat. For example, Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, 
Fishman, and Orehek (2009) gathered evidence that suicide 
terrorists usually have a personal history of loss of significance 
elicited, for instance, by experiencing ostracism or the killing of a 
close relative. In turn, engaging in extreme political violence has 
been interpreted as an effort to restore a sense of personal 
significance (Kruglanski et al., this issue).  
Creating social environments that allow people to integrate into 
culturally continuous (Routledge & Arndt, 2008; Sani et al., 2009) 
and clearly identified (“entitative”) groups or communities 
(Castano & Dechesne, 2005), such as subcultural groups or 
volunteer organizations, may reduce their initial susceptibility to 
harsh defensive responses to threat because being integrated in a 
meaningful group can buffer existential anxiety and provide secure 
cultural worldviews. Such environments may be enhanced by the 
presence of symbols representing these cultural groups, which 
become especially important under existential threat (see Jonas, 
Fritsche, & Greenberg, 2005). Of course caution is mandatory: 
High levels of ingroup identification may give rise to the basic 
phenomenon of group-based thinking, often resulting in destructive 
ethnocentrism. Especially when both the group and its individual 
members are under threat, the integration into groups might no 
longer serve as an anxiety buffer but rather will aggravate ingroup 
bias and outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1999; Fritsche et al., 2013) 
and, thus, increase intergroup conflict. Yet, here the central role of 
ingroup norms for directing self-defensive behavior comes into 
play. Rothschild et al. (2009) showed for religious fundamentalists 
that MS even has the power to significantly decrease support for 
violent solutions (to a level equivalent to that of less 
fundamentalist people), if the value of compassion had been 
activated by corresponding verses from the Bible.  
With regard to self-esteem as an anxiety buffer, people who have a 
strong sense of personal value are more resilient to mortality 
threats (Pyszczynski et al., 2004; Schmeichel et al., 2009). Thus, in 
situations of violent intergroup conflict, strengthened self-esteem 
should reduce defensive and ethnocentric responses. Tragically, 
with regard to situations of war it often seems to be common 
practice to humiliate adversary groups or individual outgroup 
members, resulting in undermined self-esteem for outgroup 
members on the collective or personal level (cf. Pyszczynski et al., 
2008). Motyl et al. (2009) suggested that feelings of humiliation 
when perceiving ingroup sovereignty and autonomy to have been 
violated play an important role in motivating people to take part in 
terrorist activities. The feeling of humiliation often results from 
military responses to terrorism, but also from harsh or illegal 
outgroup treatment, such as mistreating prisoners of war. 
Prominent cases of outgroup humiliation include video-taped 
torturing of hostages by terrorist groups or mistreatment of 
prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. In the course of violent 
intergroup conflict, undermining adversaries’ self-esteem and 
reputation may be psychologically tempting for people strongly 
affected by the conflict (such as combatants), as this may seem to 
strengthen relative ingroup status and control and to weaken the 
opposing group. However, this course of action can be costly, as it 
may trigger more extreme hostile responses to existential threat on 
the side of outgroup members. Thus, political, religious, and 
military leaders should take special care that even in severe 
situations of intergroup conflict, humiliation is prevented and 
residents of occupied countries are treated with respect and in 
accordance with ethical and humanitarian laws, such as the Geneva 
convention regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. 
 
Ingroup norms. Studies on the moderating effects of norm 
salience indicate that the content and direction of cultural 
worldview defense depend on which specific cultural norms people 
subscribe to or which social norm is salient in a given situation. 
This is why promoting norms of peaceful conflict resolution in a 
society seems particularly important in times of existential threat. 
As cultural worldviews consist largely of ingroup norms, and 
people are specifically prone under threat to act as ingroup 
members (instead of acting as individuals), peace-oriented norms 
may work best when they are identified as distinctive ingroup 
norms. In post-war Germany, “never again” became a prominent 
justification of German foreign policy, which for a long time 
refrained from military missions outside Germany. In a similar 
vein, Japan banned nuclear weapons after World War II.  
Likewise, group leaders’ public statements and actions may have a 
tremendous impact on perceived ingroup norms and, thus, on the 
direction existential threat effects may take. For example, in the 
controversy about building a Mosque close to Ground Zero, U.S. 
President Obama reminded Americans that “in this country, we 
treat everybody equally and in accordance with the law, regardless 
of race, regardless of religion” (Stolberg, 2010). An impressive 
example of the effects that the setting of peace-serving norms by 
leaders can have is the reconciliation process in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Here, leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Bishop 
Tutu promoted the idea that reconciliation instead of revenge 
between adversarial ethnic groups was necessary to ensure a 
positive future in the country. Both chaired the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which served to make public 
individual instances of crime and oppression against people of 
color without formally punishing the former perpetrators. This 
process was meant to refrain from humiliating the former 
perpetrator group and to emphasize that all people share humanity 
and dignity. This may have influenced people also in their 
everyday actions and attitudes vis-à-vis members of the racial 
outgroup and likely helped prevent civil war in South Africa. In 
this way, leaders have the power to change the direction that 
existential threat effects take in violent intergroup conflict. As 
cultural worldviews have multiple facets and include different 
values, whether they encourage, stimulate, or justify violence or 
convey peaceful and reconciliatory messages often depends on the 
rhetoric, interpretations, accentuation of political or religious 
leaders, and the media (Pyszczynski et al. 2008). What kind of 
message is delivered in times of threat should make a crucial 
difference because following MS, people are motivated to follow 
salient norms, and these are most likely to influence people when 
they are communicated by trusted leaders or other central group 
members.    
With regard to descriptive norms, research by Abdollahi et al. 
(2009) showed that direct communication about social consensus 
in a society is also an important factor that dramatically moderates 
the effects of MS on peace processes. If people feel that there is 
unanimity in a society about violent interventions being the only 
opportunity to act in an ongoing conflict, existential threat will 
increase their individual approval of violent measures. In turn, 
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communicating different standpoints reflecting social dissent and 
controversy may interrupt these effects. Often, politicians create 
consensus rhetorically (Bass, 1992), for example, by using phrases 
(e.g., “Since we all agree…,”) that suggest that no serious 
opposition exists. However, politicians should not create such 
illusions of consensus with the help of rhetoric if their statements 
are not built on facts, and especially if false statements are used to 
create unanimity (see Lewandowsky, this issue). Instead, minority 
positions of nonmilitary conflict resolution in a society should be 
given the opportunity to become publicly visible., for example, 
through media coverage. Thus, freedom of the press and policies 
that support public discourse are not only basic constituents of 
liberal democracies but also central safeguards against the self-
perpetuating cycle of intergroup violence.  
Once norms of peaceful conflict resolution are established, people 
have to be reminded of the existence of such norms in everyday 
life. People who are exposed to considerable threat may forget 
about certain rules of moral conduct or the values of their country’s 
constitution when other norms become focal, such as during 
combat missions (e.g., norms of personal safety or comradeship for 
soldiers). If reminders of humanitarian norms are absent, this may 
increase the likelihood of disastrous misconduct under threat, such 
as violence against outgroup civilians. As existential threat 
enforces thinking and acting in line with salient cultural norms, 
reminding combatants of the central moral codes of their culture is 
pivotal for preventing such phenomena as prisoner abuse or 
“collateral damage” to civilians. 
 
Self-categorization. The escalation of existentially threatening 
intergroup conflicts might be prevented not only by making salient 
peace-promoting ingroup norms but also by means of redefining 
who the (cultural) ingroup is. Recategorization at the level of a 
common superordinate ingroup has been discussed as an important 
means to improve intergroup relations in situations of intergroup 
contact (Gaertner et al., 1989). Under conditions of existential 
threat, people are more strongly inclined to think and act as 
ingroup members. Promoting perceptions of the outgroup as being 
part of a common superordinate ingroup might be a promising 
route to reducing anti-outgroup behavior under threat. Sixty years 
of political integration in post-war Europe explicitly followed this 
strategy aimed at tearing out the roots of war in Europe. However, 
although laboratory evidence suggests that the effects of MS on 
ingroup bias can be reduced when outgroups are included in an 
established common social category (e.g., making European 
identity salient led English students to evaluate the French more 
positively following reminders of mortality; Giannakakis & 
Fritsche, 2011), it is questionable whether recategorization will 
have similar effects in hot intergroup conflicts. This is because 
when intergroup conflict is particularly salient the distinction 
between ingroup and outgroup (e.g., between Muslims and Jews) 
will remain salient too, leading to social comparisons within a 
common category (e.g., monotheistic religions). Existential threat 
can be expected to further catalyze these effects, as it is driving 
thinking in terms of social identities, thus fueling the escalation of 
conflict when both primary and common identity are salient (dual 
identity). Summed up, to be effective in preventing the escalation 
of violent conflict, common ingroups have to be established in the 
long run, and they should be associated with norms of intragroup 
cooperation, diversity, and peace, reducing the detrimental effects 
dual identities can have (as is the case with the European Union).  
 
Outlook 
 
Worldview defense and group-based thinking have often been 
viewed as dangerous proclivities that have to be harnessed and kept 
under control. However, this is not the full story. From a functional 
point of view, ingroup defense might serve to increase collective 
agency under conditions of personal threat. Sticking to the ingroup 
and acting in line with its norms is an important condition of 
collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). 
Accordingly, existential threat has been shown to create a fertile 
ground for citizens committing themselves to social goals, such as 
proenvironmental behavior (Fritsche, Jonas, Niesta Kayser, & 
Koranyi, 2010) or social movements, such as political parties 
(Fritsche et al., 2008, Study 6) or human-rights groups (Fritsche et 
al., 2013, Study 6). In fact, people’s movements for nuclear 
disarmament were strongest during the Cold War, a time when 
every day brought the threat of total annihilation. Similarly, in 
many Arab countries, citizens recently resisted oppression by 
united protest, even though they were threatened with brutal force. 
Hence, the collective powers existential threat can arouse may not 
only increase the risk of nations going to war, but may also fuel 
collective movements for human rights and peace that may 
counteract violent intergroup conflict. 
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